The impact of collectivism on negotiation behaviour and its outcomes.

A perspective of collectivism as an individual factor.

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the impact of collectivism on negotiation behaviour and, consequently, on the outcome in the customer/supplier negotiations. Most previous studies classified the behaviour with a dichotomy perspective known as integrative/competitive behaviour or win/win and win/lose negotiation. Additionally, the influence of cultural factors in the negotiation process is already studied in the literature such as collectivism, but how affects the collectivism as individual factor? This question is no longer studied. Taking it into account we understand that negotiators classified as collectivistic will show more integrative behaviour and its results will be better went two collectivistic negotiators are bargaining together.. We proposed an experimental analysis to answer these questions. We have designed a customer/supplier experiment when pairs of subjects are involved in a negotiation process which was implemented in Costa Rica and France. Taking in consideration the relation between negotiation outcomes and their negotiation behaviour, we report a behavioural analysis of subjects.

Keywords: negotiation behaviour, outcome, collectivism

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A perspective of collectivism as an individual factor.

1. Introduction

Negotiations are critical business processes at both intra-organizational and inter-organizational levels. In fact the literature highlights how the outcome of the negotiation (content of the agreement and relationship created between participants) influences the
successful implementation of the negotiated relationship (Saorín, 2008a). Thus, it is understood that a successful negotiation can be assessed, among others, depending on the results obtained in terms of satisfaction (Weitz, 1981; Ganesan, 1993; Graham et al, 1994; Harwood, 2006; Kale, 2010), profits (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Pruitt, 1981; Brett et al., 1998) and/or closing or not the agreement (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Weiss, 1997; Tjosvold et al., 1999).

Also, while the various models of existing negotiation literature highlight the variety of factors that influence the complex dynamics of the negotiations and consequently the outcome, the need to consider the negotiation behaviour as the key factor is generally defended. Thus, it is argued that the way in which negotiators communicate and act is the main determinant of the outcome of the negotiations (Graham, 1985; Roure, 1997; Ghauri, 2003a, b; Saorín, 2008a, b; Saorín et al., 2013).

However, although there are previous works focused on determining the type of negotiation behaviour and/or its impact on the outcome, there are still many questions in this regard. There are several previous studies analysing the impact of collectivism on the negotiation behaviour in international negotiations. As we understand, however, those studies entail a limitation: In the vast majority of previous works, the analysis is performed at the level of the national culture, regardless of other variables that could affect behaviour, such as organizational and family culture or personal factors (Salk and Yoko, 2000; Farh, Hackett and Jiang, 2007).

Therefore, this work outlines the objective is to identify whether the effect of the individual dimension of collectivism acts in the same way as its do as national cultural factor. Finally, as an objective, we analyse the impact of the type of behaviour shown by the negotiation parties on the outcome obtained in the interaction.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Negotiation tactics
Negotiation behaviour is defined among others, as the set of communicative actions or tactics (verbal and nonverbal) that each negotiator addresses his counterpart (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Putnam, 1990; Adler et al, 1992; Rao and Schmidt, 1998; Saorín, 2008b). Thus, negotiation literature distinguishes between integrative and competitive negotiation behaviour depending on the orientation and tactics involved. From our point of view this framework of dichotomous analysis is too limited to reach a deep understanding of the dynamics and outcomes obtained in the negotiations. There are some attempts to break this traditional approach that recognize the existence of negotiation behaviour of intermediate character, although mainly at a theoretical level. As an exception we have Saorín’s proposal (2008b), who develops a typology of behaviours within a continuum which distinguishes behaviours of intermediate character, i.e., competition, attenuated competition, commitment and collaboration (Figure 1).

**Figure 1**

There are works that have focused on proposing typologies of negotiation tactics, such as the works of Lewicki and Robinson (1998), Bolman et al. (2000), Kim et al, (2005) and Adair and Brett (2005). Thus, Lewicki and Robinson (1998) identified several classes of competitive actions, grouped in five factors related to commercial negotiations: 1) Misrepresentation of Information, 2) Traditional Competitive Bargaining, 3) Bluffing, 4) Manipulation of Opponent’s Network, 5) Inappropriate Information Gathering.

Bolman et al. (2000), Kim et al, (2005) and Adair and Brett (2005), for their part, propose the following integrative negotiation actions: 1) attempt to understand the other’s needs; 2) seek mutual satisfaction of negotiators; 3) ensure a positive and productive personal relationship; 4) cooperate to obtain positive results from the parties; 5) free flow of information; 6) minimize differences among the parties; 7) trust the position and information of other negotiators; and 8) participation of all parties in the decision making process.
As can be observed, these are studies that have investigated a number of integrative or competitive actions individually. However, in this paper we argue that along all negotiation interactions different types of tactics coexist, of both integrative and competitive orientations.

Regarding tactics with competitive orientation, as indicated, we believe it necessary to distinguish between two types of action: acceptable competitive and inappropriate competitive actions. In this sense, we understand the former as those identified by Lewicki and Robinson (1998) as the traditional competitive negotiation. As the name implies, these actions are regularly used by the negotiator, and despite their competitive nature, their frequent use makes them acceptable or better tolerated by the counterpart than other competitive actions, which we call inappropriate competitive actions.

2.2. The negotiation behaviour and the outcome

Various indicators are found in the literature of negotiation in order to evaluate the outcomes obtained in the interaction. Among others to be mentioned are the achievement or not of an agreement, the profits of the participants, the individual and joint economic benefit or satisfaction with the agreement or relationship established during negotiation. However, there is some consensus in raising satisfaction as the one indicator of the outcome of the negotiation that may be applied to any type of interaction (Ganesan, 1993).

Based on the integrative/competitive dichotomy, previous research has looked into the relationship between the type of negotiating behaviour exhibited and the outcome reached. In particular, it has been demonstrated that when integrative negotiating is used, win/win agreements are easier to reach (i.e. Rubin and Brown 1975; Pruitt 1981; Adler et al. 1992; Tjosvold et al. 1999; Munduate and Medina 2005). Evidence shows that integrative behaviour enables mutual understanding, reduces uncertainties and creates a trust-based relationship between the parties (Saorín 2006, 2008a).

In contrast, evidence shows that competitive behaviour makes it difficult to reach
agreements in negotiation processes (i.e. Lax and Sebenius 1986; Munduate and Medina 2005), and if an agreement is reached, it will not be mutually satisfactory for all the parties involved, which has the consequent negative effects on the correct development and performance of the negotiated relationship (i.e. Rubin and Brown 1975; Ury et al. 1988; Weiss 1997; Tjosvold et al. 1999).

The non-agreement situation is also argued to be somewhat complex. The existence of a possible agreement zone is a key factor to be analysed (O’Connor and Arnold, 2001; Munduate et al., 2005a, b; Saorín, 2006). When an agreement is likely to be reached and due to how the process has been developed the outcome is the non-agreement, this situation should be assessed as a failure. However, when the parties realize that there is no possible agreement zone and they decide not to reach any agreement, the (non-agreement) outcome should be assessed as a success (O’Connor and Arnold, 2001; Munduate et al., 2005b; Saorín, 2006). According to Neale and Bazerman (1992) in some situations is better not to achieve an agreement when the interests of both parties are not satisfied (win/win outcome) due to its repercussions in the future.

At this point, and based on the previous arguments, since in this paper we consider a continuum of negotiation behaviours, we understand that the different types of behaviours proposed will entail varying degrees of satisfaction. Specifically, we propose that:

_Hypothesis 1: The more integrative the negotiation behaviour shown by the parties, the higher the possibility of reaching mutually satisfactory agreements._

2.3. The impact of collectivism on negotiation behaviour

Given the key role played by the type of negotiation behaviour on the outcome of the interaction, its determination emerges as a key issue to analyse. The literature shows the diversity of factors that influence the negotiation dynamics. However, there are still many questions about some of them. This is the case of collectivism, defined, as opposed to
individualism, as the concern of a person towards the group to which he or she feels connected. By contrast, the degree of individualism is seen as the concern for taking care of oneself and one’s immediate environment.

For this reason, and trying to address in depth this issue, we wish to answer the following questions in this paper: Does the collectivism as individual factor impact the negotiation behaviour? How the collectivism impacts the negotiation behaviour? To this end, sharing the argument and the perspective adopted by other authors, we consider it appropriate to consider the collectivism dimension as an individual rather than cultural variable, as this approach allows to isolate the effects of this dimension (Cai, Wilson and Drake, 2000; Drake, 2001 Cai and Kink, 2002). Analysing the effect of collectivism on the negotiation behaviour, taking the individual as the unit of analysis instead of part of a collective (national culture), we believe will allow us to respond to non-conclusive results found in some studies of negotiation and improve understanding of this relationship (individual collectivism-negotiation behaviour).

In the negotiation literature, the evidences provided in relation to the possible effect collectivism may have on the behaviour are varied, in general, and in particular in negotiation (i.e. Graham et al, 1988; Triandis, 1995; Cai and Fink, 2002; Servaes, 2003; Gesteland, 2006). More specifically, these findings relate to the influence on, among others, the decision-making process, the communication that may be established or directly to the type of behaviour most likely to show (integrative versus competitive).

As we mention previously, most of the evidence of the effect of collectivism-individualism on the negotiation behaviour is related to national culture. In this sense, we use the theoretical framework of national collectivism to propose the possible effect of collectivism from an individual perspective.

Thus, about the impact of collectivism on the type of negotiation behaviour, a wide range of studies have concluded that people in collectivist cultures are less confrontational than people
of individualistic cultures. For example, Chua and Gudykunst (1987) compare students from 37 countries and in cases of participants "from high-context cultures (who are assumed to be collectivists) these were found to be significantly less confrontational than students of low-context cultures (who are assumed to be individualistic)" (Cai and Fink, 2002: 70).

According to Graham et al. (1994), who analyse a sample of 700 business people in eleven different cultures from four Asian countries, four Anglo-Saxon countries and a Latin American country, significant evidence was obtained for concluding that in cultures with higher individualism, the trend is to use less "problem solving approach", which according to Walton and McKersie (1965), Pruitt (1981) and Graham et al. (1994) are equivalent to integrative behaviours. In their study of the American and Brazilian cultures, Volkema and Leme (2002) coincide with this analysis, concluding that the latter have less competitive behaviour than Americans and justify such behaviour by analysing the dimension of collectivism in Brazil, which presents a more collectivist culture than that of the United States (Hofstede, 2001; House, 2004).

Thus, and according to the above arguments, we propose that even adopting an individual instead of national cultural perspective in the analysis,

*Hypothesis 2: The higher the collectivism of the individual, the greater the integrative orientation of the negotiation behaviour shown.*

3. **Experimental design and procedures**

In order to achieve the objectives of this work by analysing the proposed relationships, an experiment simulating negotiation processes of the type buyer/seller or customer/supplier was performed. Thus, a total of 9 experimental sessions were implemented in France and in Costa Rica.

France and Costa Rica were chosen because of their differences in the level of national collectivism, were France is considered an individualist society and Costa Rica a collectivistic
country (Hofstede, 2001).

A total of 126 students of Business Administration from both countries participated in the experiment. Specifically, we obtained a balanced sample of 60 participants in France and 66 in Costa Rica. The names Buyer/Seller were used to define the roles adopted by the players during the experiment, and the game is presented as a process of negotiation in which participants had to interact.

The experiment consists of 8 rounds, in which the even-numbered rounds differ from the odd-numbered rounds as detailed below. No participant knows the identity of his opponent and all decisions are held in strict anonymity. Each pair forms a separate market consisting of a Buyer and Seller.

The decision of the participants is to negotiate with the opponent the purchase or selling price of three products in each of the rounds. The price at which a buyer (seller) buys (sells) each of the three products gave him a final profit expressed in ECUs (Exchange Currency Units).

The design of the experimental is based on the dilemma of Kelley (1966), which represents a negotiation situation for three products. Each of the participants has since the beginning of the experiment a paper leaf with the benefits chart taken directly from the study of Kelley (1966).

Additionally, in four rounds the participants have the opportunity to send a message to his counterpart. This is a closed message with a negotiating tactic described therein. A total of ten messages are available. These messages are associated with negotiating tactics or actions with different orientation. The list of messages is detailed below in Table 1.

Table 1.

We present the results across different behavioural variables already presented above to determine the negotiation behaviour, such us the movement of prices and the tactics (messages).
selected by subjects

These variables were used to create the variable explaining the behaviour in negotiation, defined according to the classification described in Saorín (2008b) and showing the continuum of behavioural profiles linked with the theory (from 1 to 6).

According to the classification of Saorín (2008b), we classify the typology of subjects in six categories attending to the different behaviours showed into the negotiation process.

The sessions were conducted in the laboratory of Experimental Economics of Dijon (France) and in San Jose (Costa Rica). All participants were students of the respective centres without any experience in similar games. All sessions were conducted following the standard protocol in Experimental Economics. The decisions of the individuals were anonymous and participants received an amount of cash at the end of the experiment in a confidential manner based on the results obtained during the experiment.

At the end of the experiment a set of questions was implemented including the Collectivism/Individualism psychological scales (Cai and Fink, 2002; Based on Hui and Triandis, 1986) and Satisfaction of the outcome of negotiations (Graham et al., 1994).

4. Results

In this section we present the results for the experiment based on Kelley (1996) according with the collected data for the implemented sessions. We present the results across different behavioural variables already presented above to determine the negotiation behaviour, such us the movement of prices and the tactics (messages) selected by subjects. These variables were used to create the variable explaining the behaviour in negotiation, defined according to the classification described in Saorín (2008b) and showing the continuum of behavioural profiles linked with the theory (from 1 to 6). Once we have defined them, the behavioural variables are going to explain the negotiation outcome though several scenarios, such us the monetary
outcome, the satisfaction outcome (Graham et al., 1994) and the fact that groups close or not
the negotiation process.

Assuming that groups can be formed by three categories according to the behaviour of
negotiation, we have groups formed by two integrative participants (Integrative groups), one
integrative and one competitive (Mixed groups) and two competitive individuals (Competitive
groups), with 17, 33 and 13 observations respectively. We classify the level of group
satisfaction according with these three categories.

Table 2.

The results from the table 2 allow us to answer the Hypothesis 1. We observe how the
composition of groups from a negotiation behaviour point of view has an impact on the group
satisfaction. Concretely, table 2 presents the average level of group satisfaction as we have
mentioned previously. The values critically decrease when we reduce the impact of integrative
behaviour in groups. Thus, integrative groups have on average, 4.78, while the value for mixed
groups is 4.77 and 4.09 for competitive groups. Implementing some non-parametrical tests we
are going to see if there exist some significant differences. Concretely, we use the Mann-
Whitney test to prove that there exist high significant differences when we compare integrative
groups with both and competitive and mixed groups. We argue that the fact to follow integrative
behaviour in the negotiation process reaches higher levels of group satisfaction as we propose
in the Hypothesis 1.

Taking in consideration that the mixed group is composed of integrative subjects and
competitive subjects, we analysed the individual satisfaction of both components of the mixed
groups. We obtain as result that the integrative subjects score 4.71 in satisfaction and the
competitive subjects score 4.83 in the same factor, but no significant difference was found
attending to the non-parametrical test (p-value = 0.1906). We can conclude that the satisfaction of both participants was very similar inside this type of groups.

Attending to one of the main goals of the paper, we analyse the impact of individual collectivism on the negotiation behaviour according with the Hypothesis 2. To this purpose, we run three linear regressions with the behaviour of negotiators (from 1 to 6) as endogenous variable according with Saorín (2008b) in table 3. The explanatory variables are Collectivism as the degree of individual collectivism measure using the scale (Cai and Fink, 2002; Based on Hui and Triandis, 1986), Gender, the Integrative price movement, the Integrative tactics and Country. Note that the endogenous variable was formed taking in consideration the Integrative price movement and the Integrative tactics according to the classification of Saorín (2008). The Integrative price movement indicates (from 0 to 10) the positive deviation in prices from the initial prices and the final price at the moment to close the negotiation. Integrative tactics takes value 1 if the subject has chosen an integrative tactic.

Table 3

We have divided the sample across countries as we can observe in regressions (2) and (3). The degree of collectivism matters for the whole sample (regression 1) as it has a positive and significant impact (at 1%) on the negotiation behaviour. This effect still matters in the sample collected in France and Costa Rica. Gender has significant effect and negatively related with the endogenous variable for regression in all sample (1) and in France (2) and no effect for Costa Rica (3). The impact of Integrative price movement is extremely related (at 1%) in all the cases as it was used to create the negotiation behaviour. However, the use of integrative tactics is positive and significant at 1% in all the regression excepting in regression (3). Finally the country has significant effects for the whole sample.
Hypothesis 2 was validated through the regression showed in Table 3. The higher the collectivism of the individual, the greater the integrative orientation of the negotiation behaviour shown.

Furthermore we should pay attention to the impact of collectivism in the monetary outcome from the negotiation process attending to the different countries. In this sense we present Table 4 with the average profit across countries and degrees of collectivism. Note that we have created the dichotomous variable of collectivism (High-collectivism and Low-collectivism). A total of 70 observations we observe in High-collectivism (15 in France and 55 in Costa Rica), while 56 observations are taking in consideration for Low-collectivism (45 en France and 11 in Costa Rica).

**Table 4**

Implementing again non-parametrical tests to analyse the significant differences across countries and collectivism, we observe a high significant difference (1%) for the degree of collectivism and the country to explain the level of profit in all sample. This result allows us to confirm that the degree of collectivism has a crucial importance to explain the monetary outcomes from the negotiation process, while the county has no impact in this sense.

Additionally to the satisfaction analysis reflected in Hypothesis 1 and 2, and the impact of collectivism in the integrative behaviour of subjects, we can extend the statistical analysis to the other two variables reflecting the outcome of the negotiation process, the capability to close the negotiation and the profit obtained during the interaction process.

Attending to the theory in negotiation processes, the fact that participants close the negotiation should be taken in consideration. Only 12 subjects (6 interaction groups) never close the negotiation. In line with the categorization of the study we observe only two observations in the integrative groups, four observations for the mixed groups and six observations for the
competitive groups. Thus, the 11% of subjects never close the negotiations in the integrative groups, 6% for the mixed groups and 25% in competitive groups.

Finally, we present the profit obtained in the negotiation attending to different explanatory variables to conclude the results section. Table 5 provides three linear regressions with the profit obtained in the negotiation as endogenous variable. For the explanatory variable we follow the previous results to explain the profit according to Gender, Country, Integrative members, No-Close and Satisfaction (Graham et al., 1994).

Table 5

As we observe in Table 5 the whole sample is analysed in regression (1), while only the sample for each country is included in (2) and (3). Gender has impact on the three regressions. It means that women obtained more profits than men in France, and less in Costa Rica.

The dichotomous variable of the country has effect for the total sample.

Integrative member’s is the unique variable that is not going to explain us the impact of the integrative behaviour attending to the monetary outcomes of the negotiation... Additionally, not closing the negotiation process is negatively related with profits in the three regressions.

Finally, the variable of satisfaction (Satisfaction) is positive and significantly related at 1% with the outcome obtained in the interaction.

5. Conclusions

The results obtained in the experimental design implemented, have shown, once again, that the negotiating behaviour displayed by the negotiators is the key determinant of the outcome achieved in the interaction.

Thus, more specifically, the results show that the more integrative behaviour is
displayed by the negotiators, according to our definition, the greater the degree of perceived satisfaction and the profit obtained are. These results therefore support the first hypothesis. Regarding the Hypothesis 2 is demonstrated that collectivism is a key in determining the type of negotiation behaviour factor. However, we understand, too, as a conclusion to emphasize, the need to go deeper into the impact of collectivism as an individual factor on the determination of the type of negotiation behaviour due to the results obtained at the country level. In this sense, the evidence suggests that this factor, collectivism, although can be considered as a key determinant of behaviour in negotiations, his analysis should be performed at the individual level rather than being considered as a characteristic dimension of a national culture.

At the methodological level, this work has been a challenge to the application, for the first time, the work of Kelley (1966) in an experimental setting, obtaining as a result, conclusions of great interest to both business and academic level in order to achieve a better understanding both the dynamics of the negotiations and their outcome.

This paper contributes to the understanding of the negotiation process and the effect of collectivism on its results, especially in Central America that is a region little studied.

Specifically, the understanding of different negotiation behaviors along a continuum and how the integrative actions produce better results in terms of satisfaction and profits has implications at the business level, especially when companies are interested to create long term relationships with customers and suppliers. In this sense, the challenge is to motivate counterpart to maintain a win-win negotiation although this behavior means sacrificing short-term profits for better future results.

Additionally, at the theoretical level, the treatment of collectivism from the individual dimension has been little used in the literature, where the national dimension is predominant. This approach allows the analysis of the influence of collectivism on negotiator behaviour directly from a single source of information.
We understand that this work is a first step that can form the basis for future research. Thus, we suggest that future research should deep in the determination of the type of negotiation behaviour based on the continuum by Saorín (2008b) analysing and incorporating new variables such as time pressure, power relations or the role played by the negotiator, among others. Also, we feel it important that future work address the study of such relationships from a cross-cultural approach and not just intracultural one.

Taking into account the theoretical review and the results of this research, the table 6 summarizes how findings contribute to close the gaps found in the literature.

Table 6

References


Appendix I: Tables and Figures

Table 1. Categorization of the messages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of action</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrative</td>
<td>1  “I'm interested that you are also satisfied with the results of the negotiation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2  “Product A/C is the most important to me” “The product has the best margin for me is A/C”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3  “Let's talk about the three products as one package”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate</td>
<td>4  “My price list goes from 7 to 9 (seller) / My price list only has prices from 1 to 3 (buyer)”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>5  “I have another client who wants to buy the whole stock of products */ I have another supplier that offers me better conditions */ (supplier phase, customer receiving offer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6  “This is my last price, I do not accept counter-offers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptable</td>
<td>7  “Let’s negotiate product by product”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>8  “That price would not be competitive in the market”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9  “Come on, let us close this! Let's leave it like this!”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Group satisfaction and the type of the group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average level of Group satisfaction (std. dev.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrative groups</td>
<td>4.73&lt;sup&gt;a,b&lt;/sup&gt; (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed groups</td>
<td>4.77&lt;sup&gt;b,c&lt;/sup&gt; (1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive groups</td>
<td>4.09&lt;sup&gt;a,c&lt;/sup&gt; (1.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mann Whitney test (p-values): a(0.0000), b(0.000), c(0. 0.5257).

Table 3. Linear regression to explain the impact collectivism on negotiation behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collectivism</th>
<th>(1) All</th>
<th>(2) France</th>
<th>(3) Costa Rica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.103***</td>
<td>0.0865*</td>
<td>0.125***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0295)</td>
<td>(0.0449)</td>
<td>(0.0394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.174***</td>
<td>-0.255***</td>
<td>-0.0961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0613)</td>
<td>(0.0837)</td>
<td>(0.0913)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrative price movement</td>
<td>0.0971***</td>
<td>0.0797***</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0106)</td>
<td>(0.0147)</td>
<td>(0.0155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrative tactics</td>
<td>0.391***</td>
<td>0.644***</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>-0.201***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0615)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.526***</td>
<td>3.406***</td>
<td>3.478***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0511)</td>
<td>(0.0744)</td>
<td>(0.0592)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Legend:

Collectivism: Is the degree of individual collectivism measured using the scale (Cai and Fink, 2002; Based on Hui and Triandis, 1986). (from 1 to 7, where 1 is less collectivist)

Gender: Dichotomical variable that takes value 1 if the gender is female.

Integrative price movement: Indicates the positive deviation in prices from the initial prices and the final price at the moment to close the negotiation. (from 0 to 10)

Integrative tactics: Dichotomical variable that takes value 1 if the subject has chosen an integrative tactic according to Table 1.

Country: Dichotomical variable that takes value 1 if the subject was realized the experiment in France, and 0 if the subject was from Costa Rica.

Table 4. Average of profits across countries and degree of collectivism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profits (std. dev.)</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-Collectivism</td>
<td>1456.25</td>
<td>1956.10</td>
<td>1691.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1215.68)</td>
<td>(909.37)</td>
<td>(1109.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Collectivism</td>
<td>2081.34</td>
<td>2044.69</td>
<td>2063.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(861.31)</td>
<td>(861.88)</td>
<td>(860.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1796.65</td>
<td>1995.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1122.49)</td>
<td>(888.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mann-Whitney test (p-values): a(0.0011), b(0.9790), c(0.000), d(0.6171), e(0.0071), f(0.0006)

Table 5. Linear regressions explaining the profit obtained in the negotiation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-81.07***</td>
<td>186.5***</td>
<td>-408.1***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37.45)</td>
<td>(53.15)</td>
<td>(51.77)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. Theoretical review gaps and findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical review</th>
<th>Literature gaps</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1: The more integrative the negotiation behaviour shown by the parties, the higher the possibility of reaching mutually satisfactory agreements.</td>
<td>Use of a limited dichotomous framework to analyse the negotiation behaviour. Very little research has considered Central American countries as the unit of analysis</td>
<td>The results were consistent with the theoretical review, even used the continuum of negotiation behaviours.</td>
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<td>Hypothesis 2: The higher the collectivism of the individual, the greater the integrative orientation of the negotiation behaviour shown.</td>
<td>In the vast majority of previous works, the analysis of collectivism is performed at the level of the national culture, regardless its individual factor dimension.</td>
<td>The evidence suggests that the collectivism as individual factor although can be considered as a key determinant of behaviour in negotiations.</td>
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</table>
Figure 1. Negotiation behaviour continuum

[Diagram showing the negotiation behaviour continuum with labels: Pure Competitive Behavior, Pure Integrative Behavior, Competitive Orientation, Integrative Orientation, Competition, Attenuated Competition, Commitment, Collaboration, and Integrative Orientation.]